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Abstract— The availability of electronic health data favors 
scientific advance through the creation of repositories for 
secondary use. Data anonymization is a mandatory step to 
comply with current legislation. A service for the 
pseudonymization of electronic healthcare record (EHR) extracts 
aimed at facilitating the exchange of clinical information for 
secondary use in compliance with legislation on data protection is 
presented. According to ISO/TS 25237, pseudonymization is a 
particular type of anonymization. This tool performs the 
anonymizations by maintaining three quasi-identifiers (gender, 
date of birth and place of residence) with a degree of specification 
selected by the user. The developed system is based on the 
ISO/EN 13606 norm using its characteristics specifically 
favorable for anonymization. The service is made up of two 
independent modules: the demographic server and the 
pseudonymizing module. The demographic server supports the 
permanent storage of the demographic entities and the 
management of the identifiers. The pseudonymizing module 
anonymizes the ISO/EN 13606 extracts. The pseudonymizing 
process consists of four phases: the storage of the demographic 
information included in the extract, the substitution of the 
identifiers, the elimination of the demographic information of the 
extract and the elimination of key data in free-text fields. The 
described pseudonymizing system was used in three Telemedicine 
research projects with satisfactory results. A problem was 
detected with the type of data in a demographic data field and a 
proposal for modification was prepared for the group in charge 
of the drawing up and revision of the ISO/EN 13606 norm. 
Index Terms—Electronic medical records, identification of 
persons, ISO standards, medical information systems, 
pseudonymization, telemedicine, web services 
I. INTRODUCTION 
The availability of open health data [1] for secondary use is 
fundamental for the advance in medical knowledge. The use 
of public datasets by researchers has repercussions on the 
acceleration of scientific advances as well as improvements in 
both the efficiency and efficacy of health processes [2-3]. A 
requisite for the existence of public repositories of health data 
is to guarantee patient privacy by means of anonymization and 
de-identification techniques. The legislations of different 
countries establish that the secondary use of clinical data is 
only permitted if the exchanged information is previously 
anonymized to avoid the future association with its owners [4-
5]-
This paper presents a pseudonymizing system for 
facilitating the exchange of data for secondary use in research 
projects. The system is designed and developed in accordance 
with the ISO/EN 13606 norm [6] and allows the total or partial 
anonymization of electronic healthcare records (EHR) 
extracts. The total anonymization eliminates all of the 
demographic references whilst the partial anonymization 
allows some of the demographic data (sex, date of birth, place 
of residence) to be maintained at the precision selected by the 
users. 
The anonymization process separates the clinical 
information and the associated demographic information. 
Basically it consists of the elimination of the demographic 
information of the extract, prior to storage, and the substitution 
of all of the identifiers that might be associated with specific 
demographic entities. The management of the identifiers is of 
great importance in the pseudonymization process and is 
essential in permitting future associations of the demographic 
information. 
In the communication between different systems, the 
clinical information is transmitted by following the 
mechanisms established in the norm, but instead of 
transmitting the complete EHR extract, the anonymized 
extract is transmitted. If the message is intercepted by external 
agents, the clinical information cannot be associated with a 
specific entity. The demographic information eliminated from 
the extracts is locally stored and may be recovered by means 
of consulting the identifiers that appear in the anonymized 
extract whenever the rights pertaining to access to the 
information are verified. 
II. BACKGROUND 
Research in biomedical and health sciences, key instrument 
in the improvement in the quality of life of citizens, has 
changed in recent years, both methodologically and 
conceptually, thanks to the appearance of new tools for the 
analysis of data [7]. Much has been legislated in recent years 
in this area, with special emphasis on that related to the access 
and use of personal data. 
The European Union, by means of the 95/46/EC directive 
and the Article 29 Working Party, has established the 
mechanisms necessary to guarantee the protection of the 
individual as regards the handling and free circulation of 
personal data between its Member States. It defines "personal 
data" as any information relating to an identified or 
identifiable natural person, and an "identifiable person" is one 
who can be identified, directly or indirectly (article 2a). The 
EC Data Protection Directive is not applied when the 
individual is not identifiable. The Article 29 Working Party 
has established "anonymous data" as any information related 
to a person who cannot be identified. According to ISO/TS 
25237 "Health informatics - Pseudonymization" [8], 
"anonymization" is the process that removes the association 
between the identifying data set and the data subject and 
"pseudonymization" is a particular type of anonymization that 
both removes the association with a data subject and adds an 
association between a particular set of characteristics relating 
to the data subject and one or more pseudonyms. In 
accordance with the World Health Organization (WHO) 
guidelines, "proportional or reasonable anonymity exists when 
no reasonable means of identification of specific individuals is 
available". In January 2012, the European Commission 
proposed a comprehensive reform of the EU's 1995 data 
protection rules to strengthen online privacy rights and boost 
Europe's digital economy. 
Spanish legislation follows the European 95/46/EC 
directive. According to the Spanish 14/2007 law on 
Biomedical research [9], (article 50, 2) data of a personal 
nature may only be used for research or teaching purposes 
when the interested party has expressly given his or her 
consent or when the said data has been previously 
anonymized, and (article 52, 3) the said data may only be 
preserved for research purposes in an anonymized format. 
In the United States, the Health Insurance Portability and 
Accountability Act of 1996 (HIPAA) [10] is responsible, by 
means of the Privacy, Security and Patient Safety Rules, to 
protect the privacy of the clinical information and establish 
regulations to guarantee the security of the EHR. There is no 
legislative requirement to obtain patient consent to keep 
clinical information if the data are previously de-identified. 
The HIPAA Privacy Rule [11] is concerned with protection 
against identity disclosures and provides definitions and 
standards for the de-identification of clinical data. The HIPAA 
"Safe Harbor" defines 18 data elements called Protected 
Health Information (PHI) that must be removed to consider 
that clinical data are de-identified. 
Therefore, those scenarios in which an information system 
has to send clinical information to the exterior for secondary 
use need this information to be anonymized previously. For 
this reason, it is proposed to design and develop an 
anonymizing system. 
The anonymization of sensitive information is a broadly 
addressed problem and there is an amount of solutions 
including pattern matching and machine learning methods [12-
13]. Quasi-identifiers are defined as those variables 
representing environment data that could be used to re-identify 
a person. The equivalence classes are the sets of the records 
having the same values from a set of selected quasi-identifiers. 
In k-anonymity [14], the minimum size of all established 
equivalence classes is defined as k. This means that for any 
register there are at least k-1 other registers with the same 
values of the quasi-identifiers. In order to guarantee a low re-
identification risk, a minimum value of k must be guaranteed. 
K-anonymity prevents identity disclosures. There are other 
later models such as 1-diversity and t-closeness [15] studying 
the probability and distribution of the sensitive attributes and 
protecting against attribute disclosures. 
Many investigations need to know certain personal data 
from patients in order to produce significant results; as a 
consequence anonymization cannot be total and there is a risk 
of re-identifying participant patients through present quasi-
identifiers. The most frequent and important quasi-identifiers 
for secondary use are gender, date of birth and place of 
residence. Following a study by Sweeney [16], 87% of the 
population in the United States could be uniquely identified by 
these three quasi-identifiers: gender, date of birth and their 
five-digit ZIP code. The most extended solution in order to 
reduce the re-identification probability is to group quasi-
identifiers so that the number of equivalence classes 
diminishes and their size grows as does the value of k. The 
quasi-identifiers at the extremes must be truncated in order to 
avoid re-identifications through unusual values. 
III. METHODS 
The ISO/EN 13606 norm, drawn up by the European 
Committee for Standardization (CEN) [17], has as its main 
objective the standardization of EHR transfers, or part of 
them, in a semantically operable manner. It is based on the 
following paradigms: separation of responsibilities (division 
of a complex problem into several simpler sub-problems), 
separation of points of view (definition of five points of view 
of the distributed systems: business, information, computation, 
engineering and technology [18]), together with the separation 
of information and knowledge. In accordance with the last of 
the paradigms, this standard separates the information from 
the knowledge right from its design stage, basing it on a 
double model [19]. There is a similar philosophy in the 
solutions proposed by other organizations such as HL7 [20] 
and openEHR [21], there being agreements between these 
organizations to reach common interoperability solutions, such 
as the CTMI initiative [22]. 
The double model of the norm consists of the reference 
model (information model) which defines the structures 
necessary to organize the information and the archetype model 
(knowledge model) which represents the domain of the 
knowledge formally modeling the concepts. Both models are 
mutually complemented and are necessary to achieve the 
interoperability of the clinical information. 
The norm describes a reference model (Fig. 1) which 
provides the classes necessary to represent the clinical 
information and its context. The extract (EHREXTRACT 
class) is the basic information transmission unit. The reference 
model includes a separate package for the demographic 
information of all of those actors that intervene in the EHR 
(patients, health staff, organizations, devices, etc). The 
EHREXTRACT class includes the demographic extract field 
in which the data on the participating demographic entities are 
stored in accordance with the types of demographic package. 
The rest of the fields of the EHREXTRACT class are used to 
represent the clinical information and its context. This data 
separation is very useful at the time of anonymizing the 
information, since it allows the demographic entities to be 
represented in the clinical part of the extracts only by means of 
an identification code, as occurs in the subjectof care field of 
the EHREXTRACT class, the party field of the 
RELATED PARTY class and the performer field of the 
FUNCTIONAL ROLE class. In this way, the management of 
the identifiers of the demographic entities and the elimination 
of the tracing of the subjects of the clinical data is facilitated. 
Fig. 1 shows the reference model of the ISO/EN 13606 norm, 
emphasizing its link with the demographic package and the 
identifying fields used to represent the demographic entities. 
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Fig 1. Reference model of the ISO/EN 13606 norm 
The demographic package of the ISO/EN13606 norm and 
the relationships existing between its classes are shown in Fig. 
2. The main class {IDENTIFIED ENTITY) of the 
demographic package is an abstract class that encompasses all 
of the classes of demographic entities. IDENTIFIED ENTITY 
is implemented by the rest of the specific classes of the 
package that represent the different types of entity: 
SOFTWARE'ORDEVICE, ORGANISATION, PERSON, 
IDENTIFIED HEALTHCAREPROFESSIONAL and 
SUBJECT OF CAREPERSON IDENTIFICA TION. These 
classes inherit the fields of their mother class, which will be 
common in all of the classes of demographic entities. These 
fields are: 
• extract id: type II field (Instanceldentifier), unique 
identifier used to represent this demographic entity 
within the extract 
• id: series of type 7/ identifiers from which this 
demographic entity may be referenced (national 
identify, social security, hospital numbers) 
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Fig. 2. Demographic package of the ISO/EN 13606 norm 
The type of data II (Instanceldentifier) is used to represent 
identifying objects. Class II contains six fields, but the most 
important ones are root and extension, since two II objects are 
considered equals if and only if their values of the root and 
extension fields are the same, that is, both objects would 
identify the same instance. The root field is a unique identifier 
that guarantees the overall uniqueness of the type II objects. It 
makes up a type of "names space", which, by means of a code 
assigned to an entity ensures that all of the II objects that are 
generated under its supervision are unique. The extension field 
is a chain of characters that makes up a unique identifier 
within the name space specified by root. 
As a result of previous projects in the field of standardizing 
the transfer of EHR, our group has developed an EHR server 
in accordance with the ISO/EN13606 norm [23]. Libraries 
were generated to represent the reference model, the 
demographic package and the types of data of the 
ISO/EN13606 standard. The server was developed using Java 
as its programming language, MySQL [24] for the data bases, 
XML [25] as the mark-up language, XML Schemas [26] to 
design the structure of the data, JPA libraries [27] for the 
permanent storage, JAXB libraries [28] for the automatic 
generation of Java classes and Web Services were used as 
communication technologies [29] implemented by means of 
the Axis2 tool and deployed on an Apache Tomcat 
applications server [30]. This previous work supports the 
current design and development of the pseudonymizing 
system. 
IV. RESULTS 
The pseudonymizing system was designed, developed and 
tested in accordance with the ISO/EN 13606 norm. The main 
function of this system is to eliminate links between the 
demographic data and the ISO/EN13606 clinical information 
extracts which are sent to other entities for secondary use. Its 
main characteristics are as follows: 
• It is an independent module integrated within the 
information generator and emitter of EHR extracts 
system in such a way that non-anonymized 
information is never sent out of the system of origin 
in compliance with the relevant legislation 
• In total anonymizations, it eliminates all of the 
explicit demographic information of the extracts 
• In partial anonymizations, it keeps certain quasi-
identifiers with a degree of specification configurable 
by the user 
• It eliminates the identifiers and quasi-identifiers 
(names, addresses, dates of birth) that can appear in 
any free-text field 
• The demographic information is not lost, as it is 
registered and stored correctly, allowing both its later 
recovery by the duly authorized entities by means of 
future consultations, and the maintenance of the 
coherence of the provided identifiers. 
• The same identifier always corresponds to a specific 
entity in extracts belonging to the same project 
(under the same "names space"), maintaining the 
coherence between the assigned identifiers. That is, if 
two extracts from the same project refer to the same 
demographic entity, the identifier used is the same. 
• All references to the participating entities within the 
EHR extract are eliminated by means of type 7/ 
identifiers. For this reason a mechanism to create, 
substitute and manage identifiers is enabled to make 
it impossible for external entities to establish links 
between the new identifiers and their corresponding 
demographic entities. 
The clients of this pseudonymization tool are required to 
perform a previous population study of their samples in order 
to select the degree of specificity of the adequate quasi-
identifiers guaranteeing the required k value for k-
anonymization. The system provides the tools to perform 
anonymization in accordance with these parameters in a 
systematic way. Since this tool is aimed to help very different 
natured projects with very different attributes, it is not possible 
to implement more powerful models such as 1-diversity and t-
closeness, which are based on the values of the sensitive 
attributes. 
The system is made up of two modules: a demographic 
server and a pseudonymizing module. Both modules use web 
services to offer access to its clients by means of a series of 
public functions. The demographic server can work in a totally 
independent way with clients who wish to save or recover the 
demographic information of certain entities. However, the 
pseudonymizer always works collaboratively with an 
associated demographic server, acting as a client of the 
functions offered by it. 
The work flow in the sending of pseudonymized 
information between two heterogeneous systems is detailed in 
Fig. 3. The pseudonymizing system is integrated within the 
structure of the information emitting system. The clients make 
up ISO/EN 13 606 extracts containing the information they 
wish to send from extracts already generated by different 
sources (a). The extracts are passed on to the pseudonymizer 
(b) for its treatment before being sent to the remote reception 
system (e). The suppressed demographic information is stored 
in the associated demographic server (c). If the clients within 
the emitting system are duly authorized, they could interact 
directly with the demographic server to register or recover 
demographic data. 
Fig. 3. Workflow in the sending of pseudonymized information 
The demographic server has two main objectives: the 
permanent storage of the demographic entities and to facilitate 
the demographic entity identifiers management. 
• The permanent storage is carried out by means of two 
functions (registerldentifiedEntity and 
recoverldentifiedEntity) which allow its clients to 
save demographic entities in the storage system and 
recover them by means of their identifiers. The said 
identifiers are of type II and are defined by the values 
of their root and extension fields. The demographic 
entities dealt with by the server are transmitted as 
IDENTIFIED ENTITY objects. 
• The demographic server also has several functions 
that serve as tools for the management of the 
identifiers on behalf of its "pseudonymizer" clients. 
These functions allow to know whether a specific 
demographic entity already exists in the server by 
means of any of its type / / identifiers (existll 
function), find out the value of the extension field of 
two identifiers that refer to the same demographic 
entity (equivalentExtension function) and update the 
data bases of the server in order to add a new type / / 
identifier to the list of a specific demographic entity 
(updateSetld function). 
The pseudonymizing module is in charge of 
pseudonymizing the ISO/EN13606 extracts by generating new 
identifiers starting from a value of the given root field, called 
rootProject. This rootProject value should be common for all 
of the anonymizations within the same secondary use project 
and represents a names space within which the anonymous 
identifiers are generated for all of the entities. When receiving 
an extract, the pseudonymizer sends its demographic 
information to the demographic server for its storage and 
generates a new extract where the relevant type / / identifiers 
are substituted by others within the common names space. The 
new extracts contain the same clinical information as the 
initial ones keeping just the demographic information selected 
by the client from among the following options: 
• Gender: a) removed, b) included 
• Date of birth: a) removed, b) groups of 10 years, c) 
groups of 5 years, d) year, e) month, f) day 
• Place of residence: a) removed, b) country, c) state, 
d) city, e) postal or zip code f) all included 
A detailed description of the interactions among the clients, 
the pseudonymizing module and the demographic server is 
shown in points (a) through (f) in the text and in Fig. 4 and 5. 
The extract pseudonymization begins with a call to the 
anonymizeExtract function (a) and is made up of the following 
phases: 
1) Storage of the demographic information included in 
the extract. The ISO/EN 13606 extract has a non-
obligatory field called demographic extract in which 
the demographic data of entities related to the extract 
are included. For each of these entities it is checked 
whether it is already stored (b) in the associated 
demographic server (by means of its series of 
identifiers). In the affirmative case, the series of 
identifiers are updated (c), if necessary, to enter the 
new data of the extract. If this is not the case, the 
complete entity is registered and stored (d) in the 
demographic server. 
2) Substitution of the entities' identifiers of the extract. 
In the clinical part of the extract there are several 
fields linked by type / / identifiers which refer to 
demographic entities which intervene in the extract. 
Although the identifiers in themselves do not contain 
demographic information, they must be substituted 
since the external agents would already know to 
which entity each identifier refers. The clearest case 
is the subject of attention, specifically the 
subject of care field of the EHREXTRACT class. 
But there are other, less obvious, fields which must 
equally be anonymized, such as the party field of the 
RELATEDJPARTY class and the performer field of 
the FUNCTIONAL ROLE class (see Figure 1). The 
new type / / identifiers will have rootProject as the 
value of its root field. The value of its extension field 
is assigned in such a way as to ensure that there are 
no replicated identifiers (e) and the stored 
demographic entities are updated in the server (f) 
with the new assigned identifiers. If any entity has 
already been handled in the same project and 
therefore already has an identifier with a rootProject 
value in its root field, the said identifier will be used 
to include it in the pseudonymized extract thus 
keeping the coherence of the information. 
3) Suppression of the demographic information included 
in the extract. All of the data included in the 
demographic extract field of the EHR extract are 
eliminated, except those related to the gender 
(degreeG), date of birth (degreeB) and place of 
residence (degreeA) of the entity of the subject of 
care, which are indicated with the degree of 
specification selected by the client. These data are 
useful for secondary uses as statistical and research 
studies and the client is responsible for choosing the 
sufficiently general degrees to ensure that the risk of 
re-identification of the patients is low. 
4) Elimination of key data in the free text field. 
Although the ISO/EN 13606 norm is designed to be 
able to include any type of data in a structured way, it 
is common for many extracts to include data which 
allows access to the demographic information in free 
text fields. For this reason, a mechanism was 
established to detect and correct these types of cases. 
It consists of the search in all of the already 
anonymized extract (all text fields, i.e. 
EXTRACT'CRITERIA/otherconstraints, 
RELATED PARTY/relationship, etc.) for key data, 
such as the identifiers (extension fields), names 
(entityPartName), addresses (postalCode and 
addressLine) and dates of birth (birthTime) of the 
participating demographic entities. If any result is 
found in the search, it goes on to eliminate the said 
key datum and, if it is an identifier, substitute it for its 
pseudonym. 
Fig. 4 shows, by means of a pseudocode, the specific 
actions to be carried out in the pseudonymization process. 
STEP 1: Storage of the demographic information included in the extract 
l i s t l d e n t - i f i e d E n t i t y = ehrExtracc .getDemographicExtract ( ) 
for ( i e from l i s t l d e n t i f i e d E n t i t y ) { 
r e g i s t e r e d l d = n u l l 
l t s c l d = i e . g e t l d f ) 
for ( i d from l i s t I d ) { 
i f ( e x i s t l l ( id) ) ^ | Chen r e g i s t e r e d l d = i d 
} 
i f ( r e g i s t e r e d l d != n u l l ) then { 
l i s t l d 2 = i e . g e t l d ( ) 
fo r (id2 from l i s t l d 2 ) { 
i f ( ! ( e x i s t l l ( i d 2 ) ) ) then update ld ( i e , id2) H 
i 
} 
e l s e { 
r e g i s t e r ( i e i (d) 
} 
} 
STEP 2: Substitution of the identifiers of the entities of the extract 
i f (subject_of_care != n u l l ) ( 
oldExtensionSOC = sub jec t_o f_ca re . ex tens ion 
subjec t_of_care = anonymizel l ( subjec t_of_care , root Pro]ect ) ( e , f ) 
newExtensionSOC = sub jec t_o f_ca re . ex tens ion 
} 
i f (lookForParty) { 
par ty = ¿n^nv-ize : : : p a r t y , r oo tP ro j ec t ) H H i 
} 
i f (lookForPerformer) { 
performer = anonymizell (performer, r oo tP ro j ec t ) H Ü 
J 
STEP 3: Suppression of demographic information included in the extract 
SOC = new SUBJECTOFCAREPERSONIDENTIFICATION() 
SOC.administrativeGenderCode = selectGender(degreeG, 
subject_of_care .adminis t ra t iveGenderCode) 
SOC.birthTime = se lec tBi r thDate (degreeB, sub jec t_of_care .b i r thTime) 
SOC.addr.postaICode = selectPC(degree A, subj ec t_of_care .addr .pos taICode) 
for (pap from SOC.addr.addrPart) { 
pap.addressLine = selectAL(degreeA, pap.addressLineType) 
} 
demographic_extract=null 
demographic_extract.add(SOC) 
STEP 4: Removal of key data in free-text fields 
i f (find(oldExtensionSOC)) then change(oldExtensionSOC, newExtensionSOC) 
i f (find(SOC.name.namePart.entityPartName)) then remove 
i f ( f ind(SOC.addr .addrPar t .addresLine)) then remove 
i f (f ind(SOC.addr.postalCode)) then remove 
i f (find(SOC.birthTime)) then remove 
Fig. 4. Pseudo-code of the pseudonymization process 
Fig. 5 shows the functions accessible by means of the web 
services of the two modules that make up the pseudonymizing 
system, as well as the pseudonymizing process in detail. 
(a} 
ononymize 
Extract.-
1=1 
registefldentifiedE/ tity 
Pseudonimyzing 
module 
jemograpnic 
PSEUDONIMYZING SYSTEM 
Fig. 5. Interaction between modules and clients in the pseudonymization 
process 
V. DISCUSSION 
The described pseudonymizing system has been integrated 
into the following Telemedicine projects: 1) In the CAMAMA 
project, carried out in conjunction with the Hospital de 
Fuenlabrada (Madrid) and the Hospital Clinic (Barcelona), 
which studied the automation of the sending of clinical 
information between producers (hospitals) and consumers 
(biobanks, case registers and other research groups). In 
principle, the objective was to cover only cases of cancer, but 
it was finally extended to cover all of the patients of the 
Fuenlabrada hospital. This still active project aims to reach the 
figure of 200,000 summarized clinical health records 
exchanged by means of pseudonymized extracts. 2) In the 
OBESITY project, the monitoring and control of obesity data 
in the primary attention of the 206 patients included were sent 
in anonymized extracts to the central node for its later 
secondary use. 3) In the REHABILITA project, 
pseudonymized data originating from the rehabilitation 
sessions of patients in specific scenarios were exchanged to 
cover a wide range of frameworks using peer-to-peer 
architectures for the exchange of clinical information between 
nodes. 
In the three projects, the extracts were pseudonymized 
correctly, making it impossible to establish links between the 
clinical data and its owners by means of the identifiers 
existing in the anonymized extracts, although there is a risk of 
re-identification by means of the quasi-identifiers present. In 
order to check the correct functioning of the system, several 
tests on the pseudonymized extracts are performed; these tests 
perform manual search of key data that could cause re-
identification. In the case of the OBESITY and REHABILITA 
projects, in which the number of extracts is low, all of them 
have been checked. In the case of CAMAMA a random 
sample (approximately 10% of the received extracts) is 
analyzed periodically. So far no problem was found in the 
pseudonymized information. 
In those cases in which the emitting system also wanted to 
recover demographic information from the identifiers of the 
pseudonymized extract, it was achieved successfully. In the 
above mentioned tests it was also confirmed that the same 
identifier was assigned in the anonymizations of the same 
entity in the same project, thus maintaining the coherence for 
secondary use. 
The selection of the granularity of the quasi-identifiers has 
been different in each project depending on their own 
characteristics. The researchers in these projects are 
responsible for selecting a configuration that guarantees a low 
risk of re-identification. The configurations chosen are as 
follows: 
• CAMAMA: Gender: included, Date of birth: year 
and Place of residence: removed 
• OBESITY: Gender: included, Date of birth: groups 
of five years and Place of residence: postal or zip 
code 
• REHABILITA: Gender: included, Date of birth: 
groups of five years and Place of residence: state 
The CAMAMA project establishes its equivalence classes 
from the gender and the year of birth of the patients. A 
grouping together has been carried out by age in all of the 
registers for those people over 80 years' old so as to reduce 
the probability of re-identification. At the time of writing this 
article, there are 30,000 registers available, although the aim is 
to reach the entire population of Fuenlabrada, which has more 
than 200,000 inhabitants. By means of the population pyramid 
of Fuenlabrada [31], it has been possible to approximate the 
size of the equivalence classes. The most numerous of the 
groups is that of men between 30 and 34 years' old with 9,770 
elements and the least numerous is that of men between 75 
and 79 years' old with 1,100 integrants. Assuming a uniform 
distribution in these 5 years, the equivalence classes obtained 
with the least number of integrants contains 220 elements, for 
which the value of k is 220 with these anonymization 
parameters, which guarantees an acceptable risk of re-
identification for this project. 
During the design of the pseudonymizing system a problem 
was detected in the model of the demographic package of the 
ISO/EN 13606 norm. The birthTime field of the 
SUBJECT OF CAREPEBSON IDENTIFICATION class is 
of the TS (TimeStamp) type. This implies that the minimum 
degree of specification of the dates which allows this field to 
be stored is the year, making it impossible to use it to indicate 
dates in wider ranges. As a solution, a mechanism has been 
enabled outside the demographic package to represent wider 
ranges of dates using a COMPOSITION object along the lines 
of the archetype shown in Fig. 6. However, the definitive 
solution must undergo the modification of the reference model 
of the norm in its revisions. 
archetype [adl_version=l.4) 
CEN-EN13606-COMPOSITION.Ochet_demographic_data.vl 
[atOOOO] 
language 
original_language = <[ISO_639-l::en] > 
de f in i t ion 
COHPOSITION[at0000] occurrences matches {1..1I matches { — Other demographic data 
content exis tence matches ¡0 . .1Í ca rd ina l i t y matches { 0 . . 1 ; unordered) matches { 
ENTRT[at0001] occurrences matches {0..*} matches ( — Birthtime range 
items existence matches |0. .1> ca rd ina l i t y matches { 1 . . 1 ; unordered) matches I 
ELEHENTÍHV- - : occurrences matches ( l . . l > matches { 
value existence matches ¡0 . .1) matches { 
IVLTS ' - occurrences matches <1..1> matches { — IVLTS 
lou exis tence matches |0. .1> matches { 
T3[at00ü4] occurrences matches <0..1> matches { 
time existence matches {1..1} matches {*} 
} ) 
high exis tence matches 10..1} matches { 
TS[acGCiG5] occurrences matches {0..1} matches { 
time existence matches {1..1I matches I*} 
Fig. 6. Archetype of the composition "Other demographic data" 
The pseudonymizing system is designed to be integrated 
into the original information system. In this fashion, 
information will never go unanonymized outwards. It also 
trusts in the mechanisms of the original information system to 
detect inconsistencies in the patients' data. We are working in 
a mechanism which permits to update the demographic server 
data from inconsistencies detected and communicated by the 
original system. 
As an alternative scenario, the pseudonymizing system 
could be deployed independently of any information system. It 
would be a Trusted Third Party (according to ISO/TS 25237) 
for the information systems willing to use its service. In this 
way service could be supplied to projects having their data in 
separate information systems. In the case of this configuration 
it is essential that the communication between the information 
systems and the pseudonymizer be safe, since non-
anonymized data are being transmitted. 
One detected limitation of the current system is that 
multimedia data in the extracts can contain patients' 
information (i.e. DICOM images, attestedview screenshots) 
and they are not anonymized. Other detected limitation is the 
apparition of other identifiers (for instance pseudonyms) 
occurring in textual fields not included in the 
demographic extract or not registered in the demographic 
server that are not detected. To solve these limitations, the 
original information system should make sure that these 
circumstances will not happen before anonymization. 
VI. CONCLUSION 
The pseudonymization of the EHR extracts thwarts the 
identification of the clinical data owners. In this way, it 
facilitates compliance with current data protection legislation 
in the exchange of clinical information for secondary use. 
Different research projects present different necessities as 
regards the de-identification of their patients, there being a 
balance between the data present for the extraction of results 
and the risk of re-identification. The presented tool allows the 
de-identification in different scenarios to take place, the 
researchers being responsible for the choice of the most 
suitable parameters given the characteristics of each project. 
The reference model of the ISO/EN 13606 clearly separates 
the clinical and the demographic information in such a way 
that if there were references to demographic entities within the 
clinical information, they could only be implemented by 
means of identifiers. On the other hand, the demographic 
entities might have more than one identifier to be referenced, 
and this is indicated in the field proper to the demographic 
entity. These characteristics, proper to the norm, facilitate the 
management of the identifiers and the anonymization of the 
extracts. Because of this, the norm brings together the ideal 
characteristics to be the basis of a pseudonymizing system. As 
a consequence of this work, a modification is going to be 
proposed to the implementation and revision group of the 
ISO/EN 13606 norm, in which some of the authors participate 
so that the demographic package of the reference model is 
able to register an interval in the date of birth. 
When carrying out the pseudonymization of the extracts, the 
demographic information of all of the entities participating in 
the demographic server is also saved. The said information 
will always be available, both for the project that generated it 
and for any other use within the information system into 
which the pseudonymizing system is integrated. Any suitable 
application would be able to request the said data from the 
demographic server, and this may be shown by previously 
proving that the applicant has the permission necessary to 
access the said information. 
The pseudonymizing system has been integrated and used 
in active telemedicine projects of our work group. It has gone 
on to form part of the platform of services offered by our 
research unit [32] together with other services such as: the 
storage and recovery of ISO/EN13606 extracts, the validation 
of extracts, archetype editor and server [33] and randomization 
service. 
The repository of anonymized information obtained from 
the aforementioned research projects, has permitted a 
promising line of research to commence based on 
KnowledgeDiscovery in Databases (KDD) and Data Mining 
(Association Rules) techniques [34] for the extraction of 
clinical knowledge. 
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